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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Respondent ("plaintiff") admits that the Statement 
of Facts in Appellant' s Brief is correct insofar as it describes 
events of the marriage and property that was subject to division 
upon dissolution of the marriage (Brief of Respondent, p. 2). 
Plaintiff then complains that the Statement of Facts in Appellant7 s 
Brief mischaracterizes the evidence (without stating which evidence 
is mischaracterized or correcting the misinformation for this 
Court) and editorializes upon the actions of the lower court (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 2). Plaintiff professes her desire to avoid 
such an inappropriate use of the Statement of Facts by discussing 
"only relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the legal 
issues" raised by the appeal (Brief of Respondent, p. 4). 
Nonetheless, the remainder of plaintiff s Statement of Facts is 
dedicated to: (1) admonishing this Court that this case may not be 
viewed in a vacuum and thus, if this Court makes major changes in 
the Divorce Decree, it may be appropriate to remand to the trial 
court to allow that court to apply appropriate law in re-
distributing the parties7 assets; and (2) attempting to convince 
this Court that the inequitable division of property and incorrect 
legal rulings rendered by the trial court were the result of its 
finding that defendant was not a credible witness. 
The defendant does not dispute that, if this court makes 
major changes in the property division, it may be appropriate to 
remand the matter to the trial court to make adjustments in the 
award; however, whether remand will be necessary or appropriate 
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depends upon this Court' s ruling and its impact upon the property 
division. The defendant strongly objects to the plaintiff's 
attempts to attack his character before this Court. In order to do 
so, the plaintiff not only mischaracterizes the evidence, she 
blatantly alters the facts. 
Without citing the record, plaintiff alleges that defendant 
described his financial statements as "false summaries" or "gross 
exaggerations" of his real net worth (Brief of Respondent, p. 6). 
In fact, defendant did note that a financial statement prepared in 
1984 was grossly exaggerated, to the point of being incorrect, in 
that the real estate in 1984 was greater than its value at the time 
of trial (R. 569, p. 20-21). The plaintiff then attempts to 
characterize the defendant as a gambler who expended large amounts 
of the parties' estate in gambling but cites no supporting 
testimony. Defendant admitted that he did engage in gambling. 
However, the amounts expended could hardly be characterized as a 
large portion of the parties' estate as the gambling was limited to 
betting on football and basketball games, horse racing and, 
occasionally, cards (R. 570, p. 260-262). 
Finally, the plaintiff points to a bank account which was 
allegedly hidden by the defendant and "contained $60,000.00" (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 6). In fact, the testimony cited by plaintiff 
indicates that the bank account had a total of $60, 000.00 worth of 
transactions in the year 1986 (R. 571, p. 363). After that year, 
it was effectively inactive, as the business for which it was 
created ceased to exist, and, at the time of trial the account 
held approximately $134.00 . 
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While the plaintiff asserts that defendant' s lack of 
credibility was the basis for the trial court' s inequitable 
property distribution, there is no indication that the trial court 
was at all impressed with the plaintiff s attempts to malign the 
defendant' s character. Referring to the financial statements which 
plaintiff apparently believes convinced the court that defendant 
lied about the value of his assets, the court noted simply "I think 
you have already demonstrated here today that financial statements 
are prepared for lots of different purposes, depending on who looks 
at them. '• (R. 569, p. 55). 
Finally, and most importantly, the issues before this Court 
have very little to do with defendant' s credibility. The issues 
are legal issues. Defendant' s credibility simply plays no part in 
their resolution. Consequently, the facts presented by the 
plaintiff to this court in an attempt to impeach the defendant' s 
credibility are simply irrelevant and are no more than an attempt 
to smoke screen the fact that the trial court erred as a matter of 
law and, as a result, rendered an extremely inequitable decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT 
TO PAY PLAINTIFF' S COSTS. 
The plaintiff admits that, under Utah law, the defendant 
could not be ordered to pay expert witness fees and other costs 
incurred by the plaintiff in preparation for trial, which exceed 
the fees and costs allowed by statute. The plaintiff argues that, 
in the instant case, that maxim was not violated because the costs 
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that the defendant was ordered to pay were treated, not as costs of 
litigation, but as a debt owed by the plaintiff, which the 
defendant was ordered to pay. The plaintiff cites the discourse 
between her counsel and the trial court in which counsel 
acknowledges that evidence of expert witness fees would be 
irrelevant in a personal injury suit, because the fees could not be 
awarded, but argues that in a divorce proceeding a trial court must 
apportion all assets and debt justifying admission of the amount of 
the expert witness fees as evidence of a debt. Indeed that is the 
basis upon which the trial court permitted introduction of evidence 
of the expert witness fees. 
If this Court accepts the plaintiff's reasoning, the rule 
that litigation costs may be awarded only as provided for by 
statute will be effectively abrogated. Counsel will simply 
introduce the expert witness fees and then argue that they are not 
being introduced to show costs of litigation but as evidence of the 
financial obligations of the parties which the trial court is 
entitled to award. That argument would apply to all types of 
litigation, for example, in divorce matters, counsel will argue, as 
did plaintiff s counsel, that the fees are a debt, which the court 
may equitably apportion; and in personal injury or breach of 
contract suits, the fees will be introduced as a debt that is part 
of the damages sustained as a result of the malfeasance at issue. 
In short, contrary to plaintiff's argument, " a trial court 
cannot require one party to pay the other party' s witness fees in 
excess of the statutory rate. " Sorensen v. Sorensen, P. 2d 
, Slip Op. 87012-CA (Feb. 10 1989). A trial court may award 
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only costs of a type and in an amount allowed by statute. Stevens 
v. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952, 959 (Utah App. 1988). Litigants should 
not be able to circumvent that rule of law by characterizing the 
costs as a debt that must be apportioned upon divorce or the 
governing statutes and rulings are meaningless. In the instant 
case, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ordering the 
defendant to pay nearly $24, 000. 00 in excess of the costs that may 
be awarded under Utah law. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT 
TO PAY IN FULL THE PLAINTIFF' S CLAIMED ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
2L The Fees Charged By Plaintiff7 s Counsel Are Unreasonable. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court correctly ruled that her 
$75, 000. 00 attorneys' bill is reasonable because the evidence 
indicated that the case was difficult and required additional time 
to obtain information from the defendant. Further, the plaintiff 
notes that her lead counsel testified that he knew of several 
The plaintiff supports her argument that the expert witness 
fees are not "costs" in the instant case by pointing to the fact 
that she was not required to submit a memorandum of costs under 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That only serves to 
emphasize that the trial court disregarded Utah law in awarding the 
costs. Rule 54 provides the only mechanism for submitting a cost 
bill and obtaining an award of costs. The trial court' s decision 
circumvented that mechanism by simply awarding the costs as part of 
the divorce decree although the plaintiff admits that she "made no 
attempt" to file the memorandum required by Rule 54 (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 10). Thus, in ordering defendant to pay the 
plaintiffs costs, the trial court not only disregarded the rule 
that it was limited to awarding costs that are statutorily allowed, 
it disregarded the procedure mandated by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for awarding costs of litigation. 
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attorneys that charged a rate similar to his own. This simply 
misses the central point made in defendant' s appellate brief: the 
bill submitted by plaintiff s counsel is unreasonable, as a matter 
of law, in that it includes costs, such as fees for appraisers, 
word processor charges, and delivery fees that cannot be awarded 
under Utah law and/or are normally included in an attorney' s 
billable rate. 
A divorce litigant has the freedom to contract competent 
counsel and reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded, even if the 
litigant' s counsel is expensive. However, the trial court has the 
responsibility to guard against abuses and determine that the fees 
are indeed reasonable. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1384-1385 
(Utah 1980). The trial court in this case erred because it 
neglected that responsibility and merely rubber stamped the bill 
submitted by plaintiff's counsel as "reasonable." 
JL. Plaintiff Is Able To Pay Her Attorney's Fees. 
Plaintiff argues, in effect, that if she is forced to pay her 
attorney' s fees she must sell the stock that she was awarded 
leaving her without that asset. That argument is somewhat 
difficult to follow in that it implies that the defendant has some 
way to pay the bill and still keep the assets he was awarded. That 
2
 In fact, plaintiff's counsel testified that prominent 
counsel in this jurisdiction that specialize in domestic litigation 
charge $150.00 per hour, ten dollars less than his billing rate. 
(R. 371, p. 380) 
3
 She also argues that it is "undisputed" that she has no 
"useful occupation", as she is merely a housewife and a mother 
(Brief of Respondent, p 17). That is an outlandish statement in 
any case, which is further belied in this case by the fact that 
she testified that she had the skills and experience necessary to 
manage the Bel-Aire Apartments. 
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is not the case. The only liquid assets owned by the parties are 
the stocks. Plaintiff was awarded (by the court's appraisal) stock 
worth approximately $200,000. 00 more than that awarded to the 
plaintiff. At the same time he is awarded approximately 130,000.00 
in matured debt and debt amounting to approximately $55,000. 00 
that is secured by the stock (and thus must be retired if the 
stock is to be sold). Consequently, in order to pay the matured 
debt, the defendant, like the plaintiff, will have to sell 
virtually all of the stocks he was awarded, pay taxes on the sale 
and will be left without the benefit of the asset. 
Plaintiff s version of the defendant' s ability to earn 
sufficient income to pay the debt is equally difficult to follow. 
Relying upon her Trial Exhibit 52 (attached to Appellant' s Brief as 
Exhibit "Li") Plaintiff argues that defendant can be expected to 
continue to have a "disposable income" of approximately $200,000.00 
per year. That exhibit simply fails to support such a conclusion. 
Approximately $48,000.00 of the income noted in that exhibit for 
1986 is income from the Bel-Aire, which was awarded to the 
plaintiff and, in order to maintain income at that level in 1986, 
defendant sold $90,000.00 worth of assets. Thus, the plaintiff's 
own exhibit indicates that the defendant' s income is approximately 
half of what plaintiff would have this court believe. From that 
income, the defendant is burdened with virtually all of the 
parties' debt and is required to support the cash drain posed by 
the Broadmore Apartments, which, contrary to plaintiff's 
allegations and due to her reluctance to cooperate, has not been 
sold. 
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In short, the tremendous attorneys' fees incurred by the 
plaintiff present the difficult problem attendant a large, matured 
debt. However, the facts indicate that the property and alimony 
awarded to the plaintiff are sufficient to meet her need and pay 
the debt. Consequently, the trial court erred in ordering the 
plaintiff to pay defendant' s attorneys' fees. 
POINT III. 
THE BANK ACCOUNTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN VALUED ON THE DATE OF TRIAL. 
The plaintiff argues that the trial court properly valued the 
parties' bank accounts in accord with the statements submitted by 
the plaintiff because those statements were the "best evidence" of 
the value of the accounts. In fact, the statements submitted by 
the plaintiff clearly indicate that the accounts were working 
accounts, with balances that fluctuated on a daily basis. 
Moreover, it is common knowledge that bank statements can be 
deceiving; they reflect checks that have cleared on a certain day 
and do not reflect checks that are outstanding. Thus, the "best 
evidence" of the balance in a checking account is evidence of the 
account balance on certain day, less outstanding checks. That is 
the evidence that was presented to the court by the defendant when 
testifying as to the balances in the accounts (R. 569, pp 28-35). 
Plaintiff argues that the court could have found that the 
defendant drained the accounts, justifying valuation in accord with 
the balances shown on the statements. However, there was no 
evidence to indicate that the accounts had been improperly drained, 
the plaintiff did not so much as challenge the defendant's 
testimony of the balances or outstanding checks and the trial court 
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did not find that the defendant had dissipated the assets. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in not valuing the bank account 
in accord with the balances on the date nearest trial. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY 
AS PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENT INCOME TO MEET HER NEEDS 
AND DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO PAY THE AMOUNT ORDERED. 
Not surprisingly, plaintiff s brief illustrates that she has a 
completely different view of what the evidence indicates as to her 
need for alimony and the defendant' s ability to pay. Defendant 
maintains that, if this Court reviews the Appellant7 s brief and the 
evidence, it is, at minimum, reasonable to conclude that the assets 
awarded plaintiff produce sufficient income to meet her needs and 
defendant is without the ability to pay alimony. Thus, contrary to 
plaintiff s assertion, this is not a case where need for alimony 
and ability to pay are clear (Brief of Respondent at p. 24). 
The purpose of alimony is to provide support for a spouse in 
need. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). 
However, the award must be justified as it is an ongoing burden on 
the paying spouse and runs the risk of being used as a penalty 
against the payor or an award to the payee. See English v. 
English, 565 P. 2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). Thus, when need for 
alimony and ability to pay are not clear, as in the instant case, a 
trial court must support an award of alimony with findings of fact 
on need and ability to pay that are "sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. " Stevens v. 
Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988). In this case, the 
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trial court's substantial alimony award is supported by no 
findings on the plaintiff s need or the defendant' s ability to pay 
alimony. Instead the trial court simply concluded that it is 
reasonable that the defendant be ordered to pay $2,000.00 per month 
alimony, which will be reduced by only $250.00 per month at 
defendant' s estimated age of retirement when he will lose his only 
reliable source of income. It is impossible to determine how the 
court reached the conclusion that such an award is reasonable. In 
fact, it is unreasonable, given that the plaintiff is awarded 
assets that produce an income in excess of her needs. Thus, the 
defendant respectfully requests that the award of alimony be 
reversed. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER TAX CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE A RESULT OF ITS 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY. 
Incredibly, plaintiff argues that there is no indication in 
the instant case that the defendant will have to sell any of his 
assets to pay the matured debt he was awarded because his "income 
and ability to borrow money should be sufficient to take care of 
the matured obligations. '• In the instant case, the defendant was 
awarded $130,000 in matured debt, consisting primarily of the debt 
owed to plaintiff s attorneys and her costs of litigation. 
Assuming that these debts could be paid over time, or that money 
could be borrowed to pay the debts over five (5) years at ten 
percent (10%) interest (which is conservative) the payment incurred 
by defendant would be over $2,700.00 per month. Certainly, if the 
court intended the defendant to pay the debt that manner, such a 
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large monthly payment should have been considered in determining 
whether defendant can afford to pay alimony. The record reflects 
no such consideration. Reasonably, the only method available for 
the defendant to pay the matured debt is the sale of the parties' 
stock. Such a sale necessitates tax consequences and costs of sale 
which would effectively consume one-half (%) of the value of the 
stock (see, defendant' s proposed distribution of assets attached to 
Appellant's Brief as Exhibit " H, " demonstrating that the parties' 
stock, at a fair market value of $303,557 [which includes the stock 
awarded to plaintiff] has an after tax equity of $118,281). 
Plaintiff also asserts that the funds from the PSI partnership 
were improperly applied to a line of credit which was written on 
defendant' s dental practice. In fact, the line of credit which the 
defendant applied the proceeds from the PSI sale had no connection 
with his dental practice and there is no evidence to indicate that 
it did. The line of credit was in the name of Dr. Morgan. It 
existed prior to the parties' marriage and constituted a marital 
debt that was awarded as part of the divorce decree. Consequently, 
by applying the proceeds to pay the marital debt, the defendant 
effectively sought to assure that plaintiff shared equally in the 
proceeds. 
In short, this is a case where there will undoubtedly be tax 
consequences from the sale of assets due to the court' s property 
division. Because the court order requires only the defendant to 
sell his assets to pay matured debt, it is inequitable that the 
court refuse to consider the tax consequences and sales costs 
attributable to the sale of those assets, which, due to the 
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magnitude of the debt, exceed $100,000. Because the trial court' s 
determination renders sale of the parties' stock a necessity and 
thus renders the tax consequences and costs of sale a certainty, 
the trial court erred in failing to consider the tax consequences 
attendant sale of the stock awarded to the defendant. 
POINT VI. 
THE VALUE OF A MINORITY PARTNERSHIP INTEREST SHOULD 
BE ITS FAIR MARKET VALUE, WHICH INCLUDES A DISCOUNT 
FOR A MINORITY INTEREST. 
The plaintiff makes three (3) points in disputing defendant's 
argument that the trial court erroneously failed to consider a 
minority discount when valuing his partnership interests. These 
arguments are: 
1. The trial court has discretion in determining how to 
value a partnership or closely held corporation; 
2. A minority discount is not appropriate if other partners 
are required to purchase the partnership interest of a withdrawing 
partner on the basis of the value of the partnership assets; and 
3. Minority discounts are applicable only if sale is 
imminent. 
It is true that the trial court has discretion in valuing 
stock or partnership interest. However, even given that 
discretion, the trend in courts that have considered the issue is 
to find that failure to consider a minority discount constitutes an 
4
 Defendant seeks to differentiate the position of a 
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation from a minority 
shareholder in a partnership. In truth, these interests are more 
alike than different. They both suffer from the difficulties 
inherent in selling an interest that does not have the ability to 
control the entity. 
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abuse of discretion. See, In Re the Marriage of Reiling, 66 
Or. App. 284, 673 P. 2d 1360, 1365 (1984); In the Matter of the 
Marriage of Belt, 65 Or. App. 606, 672 P. 2d 1205, 1207-1208 (1983); 
Hayes v. Hayes, 756 P. 2d 298 (Alaska 1988). In so holding, the 
Court in Hayes specifically rejected the argument that a minority 
discount is inappropriate unless the sale of the interest is 
contemplated. 756 P. 2d at 300. In fact, a minority discount is 
nothing more than acknowledging the fact that minority interests in 
closely held corporations and partnerships should be valued, like 
any other asset, at its fair market value. The fair market value 
of those assets includes a minority discount because the minority 
interest holder is at "the so-to-speak mercy of other stockholders 
. . . " Reiling, 673 P. 2d at 1365. 
Without guidance from this Court as to the proper method of 
valuing minority interests in closely held corporations or 
partnerships, litigants are treated unequally in different courts. 
Some courts apply a minority interest while others, relying upon 
the same or similar partnership agreements, refuse to do so. 
Thus, partners in the same partnership may find themselves being 
treated diversely when the value of their assets is being evaluated 
in different courts. Guidance from this court at this time, as to 
the proper method in valuing minority interests, would promote 
consistency at the trial court level and equity among litigants. 
Finally, as the plaintiff points out, if there is some 
agreement that remaining partners or shareholders are required to 
purchase the interest of a withdrawing minority interest holder at 
a price calculated by the pro rata share of the value of the 
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partnership or corporate assets, it may be appropriate to disregard 
a minority interest. However, that simply is not the case in the 
instant action. The sections of the partnership agreement cited by 
plaintiff do not require that interest holders in the SunVest 
partnership or in Eckman & Midgley purchase the interest of a 
retiring or deceased partner at the value of the partnership 
assets. Instead, the remaining interest holders are given ninety 
(90) days in which to elect to purchase the minority interest at 
that value. If they choose not to elect to do so, there are severe 
restrictions on the ability to sell the minority interest to other 
parties, thus justifying the minority discount. As a result, in 
the instant case, the court abused its discretion in failing to 
apply a minority discount in calculating the fair market value of 
the defendant' s minority partnership interest. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, the trial court abused its discretion as 
a result of several erroneous rulings on matters of law. 
Consequently, the trial court' s property division inequitably 
awards the defendant insufficient assets to pay the matured debts 
with which he was burdened and to meet his alimony obligation. 
Consequently, the trial court' s property division should not be 
upheld. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 1989. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
MWW. 
DAVID S.I DOLOWI.TZ 
JULIE A. BRYAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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